theempress999

By Peter W. Dickson
July 18, 2008

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s call for a timetable on American troop withdrawals has touched off a dramatic change in the debate over the future U.S. engagement in Iraq – essentially, it marks a falling away of the fig-leaf rationales for the five-plus years of occupation

As these fig leaves drop to the ground, they are exposing raw geo-strategic objectives that were present in the original calculations of Republican foreign policy experts going back to the early 1990s, a desire for a firm U.S. foothold in the Middle East to protect the West's access to oil and to defend the state of Israel from, then, primarily its Arab enemies.

Those objectives were outlined in the Paul Wolfowitz-inspired Defense Strategy paper prepared in 1992 that argued in favor of an American version of the imperial British “East of Suez” concept of projecting power into this strategic region.

Going “East of Suez” also made sense to Donald Rumsfeld and other political leaders who observed that once America’s Cold War role as the protector of Western Europe had ended, the U.S. needed a new mission in a new region to sustain its superpower status.

Furthermore, the United States had a refurbished and well-funded military machine, with a volunteer Army, which had come off a great victory in the Gulf War and a successful air war against Serbia in the 1990s.

““What good is it having the most powerful military in the world if you don’t use it?” Secretary of State Madeleine Albright reportedly asked Gen. Colin Powell during the Bosnian crisis.

All these ambitions, calculations and objectives relating specifically to the Middle East suddenly were achievable after the 9/11 attacks, but the Bush administration hid them behind other rationales – such as the goal of spreading democracy, the need to fight global terrorism or Islamo-facism, and the search for weapons of mass destruction.

Ironically, it required the decline in violence that followed the U.S. troop “surge,” coupled with bribes to Sunni tribes and the ethnic cleansing of mixed Baghdad neighborhoods, to create enough stability inside Iraq for the Maliki government to cross the political Rubicon and ask Washington to agree to a troop withdrawal timetable.

Maliki put this request on the table on July 7 when he observed that the long-term security accord that had been under discussion with Washington for months must include "a memorandum of understanding either for the departure of the forces or a timetable for their withdrawal."

The White House, the Pentagon and John McCain’s presidential campaign were caught off guard and fumbled their responses – in part because Maliki’s call for a timetable stripped away some of the more noble-sounding reasons for keeping U.S. troops in Iraq indefinitely, especially the defense of Iraqi sovereignty and the protection of its fledgling democracy.

Simultaneously, Maliki’s call for a withdrawal timetable played into the hands of Barack Obama because he long has advocated reducing the U.S. military presence to a residual force within 16 months of taking office.

Suddenly, Maliki was urging something similar, reflecting the nationalistic sentiments of many Iraqis who resent the presence of foreign troops on their land. Maliki’s position also was welcomed by many Americans tired of this open-ended, bloody war.

If Bush's “democracy” rationale meant anything, it presumably would include respecting the will of the Iraqi people and their elected leaders. How could Bush, McCain and other war supporters continue to tout that uplifting cause if they brushed aside what the Iraqis want?

Yet, as the “democracy” fig leaf was falling away, oil was soaring to $140 a barrel and Iran was showing defiance against international pressure to stop its nuclear enrichment program. Iran also conducted test launches of medium-range missiles that could reach Tel Aviv.

So, the Realpolitik rationales of extracting more Iraqi oil and countering Iran’s regional ambitions were growing more acute even as the notion of respecting the will of the Iraqi people – as well as the American public – was growing more tenuous.

TheEmpress,

P.S. It was clear to me all along, they wanted Americans to leave. Maliki was on the weak side, and could be bullied into saying what Mr. Bush, and Staff requested. But, it never was the will of the people, who dispised his weaknesses, and felt him a puppet.

http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/071708b.html